

OECD Environmental Health and Safety Publications

Series on Chemical Accidents

No. 12

**Report of the Workshop on Communication related to Chemical
Releases Caused by Deliberate Acts**

Rome, Italy, 25 – 27 June 2003

Environment Directorate
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Paris, 2004

OECD information to be added afterwards

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FOREWARD

This report presents the main output of the Workshop on Communication related to Chemical Releases Caused by Deliberate Acts, which took place in Rome, Italy, on 25-27 June 2003. The workshop was co-sponsored by seven international organisations: the *OECD* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), the *NATO* (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), the *OPCW* (Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), *REMPEC* (Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Centre for the Mediterranean Sea)/*UNEP-IMO* (UN International Maritime Organisation), the *UN-ECE* (UN Economic Commission for Europe), *UNEP* (UN Environment Programme), and the *WHO* (World Health Organization). The workshop was hosted by the 'Fire Fighters, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department' of the Italy Ministry of Interior.

50 experts representing nine member countries, one non-OECD country, and the sponsor organisations, as well as a number of observers invited by the host country, attended the Workshop. Participants came from government, industry, academia, international organisations and other non-governmental organisations (see List of Participants in Annex 2).

The objective of the Workshop was to exchange experience and solutions regarding policies in connection with public information in the context of deliberate chemical threats and explore the potential conflict between transparency and increased risk.

The Workshop included sessions on: (i) Community right-to-know *versus* information security; (ii) Public/private communication partnerships; (iii) Chemical facilities security: Communication challenges; (iv) Crisis communication; and (v) Capacity building (see Workshop Agenda in Annex 1).

The OECD Working Group on chemical Accidents recommended that this report be forwarded to the Joint Meeting of the Chemical committee and Working Party on chemicals, Pesticides and Biotechnology, for consideration as an OECD publication. The Joint Meeting agreed that it should be made available to the public. It is published under the authority of the Secretary-General of the OECD. *[paragraph to be added after approval by the WGCA and the Joint Meeting]*.

WORKSHOP REPORT

Introduction

1. A Workshop on "Communication Related to Chemical Releases Caused by Deliberate Acts", was organised within the context of the IOMC Co-ordinating Group on Chemical Accidents¹. This Workshop was a part of the activity on "Counter-terrorism: New security risks related to chemicals". The OECD had the lead in organising the Workshop².
2. This event was co-sponsored by seven international organisations: the *NATO* (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), the *OECD* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), the *OPCW* (Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), REMPEC (Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Centre for the Mediterranean Sea)/*UNEP-IMO* (UN International Maritime Organisation), the *UN-ECE* (UN Economic Commission for Europe), *UNEP* (UN Environment Programme), and the *WHO* (World Health Organization).
3. The Workshop was hosted by the "Fire Fighters, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department" of the Ministry of Interior in Italy. It took place on 25 – 27 June 2003, at the "Istituto Superiore Antincendi" (ISA), Rome, Italy.
4. The Workshop was chaired by **Debbie Dietrich**, Director of Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO), EPA, US. In addition, every session had a chair person (see the name of session chairs in the Workshop Agenda in Annex 1 to the report).

Why a Communication Workshop?

5. In light of terrorism events of September 2001, public authorities, industry, and communities are undertaking further efforts to prevent and prepare for possible terrorist events involving chemical (as well as other) substances, to protect public health and the environment from the consequences of such events.
6. A meeting of the IOMC Co-ordinating Group on Chemical Accidents (CGCA) was held in Geneva, in June 2002, on "*Counter-terrorism: New Security Risks Related to Chemicals*". One of the recommendations of this meeting was that a workshop should be organised related to risk communication and public information. It was further agreed that the workshop should be co-sponsored by interested international organisations. The OECD, as current Secretariat for the CGCA, was tasked with taking the lead in organising the Workshop.
7. The CGCA meeting identified issues that are unique to situations where a chemical incident is caused by deliberate act and concluded that one of the most pressing issues relates to communication with the public. For example, in many countries there is an on-going debate concerning the importance, on the one hand, of providing information to the public (and to other countries), and on the other hand, the need to maintain security of any information that might facilitate terrorist acts.

¹ The Inter-Organisation Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC) is composed of seven international organisations: UNEP, ILO, FAO, WHO, UNIDO, UNITAR and OECD. The IOMC Co-ordinating Group on Chemical Accidents (CGCA) includes other organisations interested in the subject, including the UN ECE, REMPEC, OPCW and NATO, as well as representatives of industry, labour, environmental groups and national authorities.

² The OECD is the Secretariat to the IOMC Co-ordinating Group on Chemical Accidents.

8. The CGCA meeting also noted that one goal of terrorist activities is to cause panic and disrupt systems; risk communication is a critical component of addressing this. It was recognised there is obviously a conflict between more transparency to reassure the public, and confidentiality to ensure site security. In addition, it was pointed out that in the “Internet age”, withholding of official information only encourages the dissemination of incorrect or incomplete information from unofficial sources. In a related matter, it was suggested that the need for risk-related information concerning hazardous installations diminishes if the installation increases its level of inherent safety.

Objectives and Scope

9. The objectives of the Workshop were to:

- Exchange experience and solutions regarding policies, programmes and tools in connection with risk communication and public information related to chemical threats as the result of deliberate acts (in order to minimise the risks of chemical incidents and to mitigate adverse effects to health and the environment should an incident occur);
- Identify the elements of risk communication that are different in the context of terrorist acts, as compared to risk communication related to chemical safety in general;
- Explore the potential conflict between transparency and increased risk, i.e. the need to provide information to the public concerning possible risks in a community (both before and after possible incidents), versus the need to limit public dissemination of information that might increase those risks by facilitating terrorist attacks;
- Discuss the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders;
- Address issues related to the exchange of information between countries concerning potential and actual trans-boundary incidents;
- Begin development of guidance on effective policies and practices, including consideration of the nature of information that should be shared, the audiences for such information, and who should be responsible for providing information; and
- Identify issues that could benefit from further exploration in a national or international context.

10. The scope of the Workshop included sabotage and attacks against hazardous installations (production/storage) or transport facilities, as well as the deliberate release of hazardous chemical substances in a way that could harm human health or the environment (effectively becoming chemical weapons).

Survey of existing policies, tools and programmes

11. A questionnaire was developed to establish an inventory of existing policies, tools or programmes related to the provision of information to the public associated with risks to the public from releases of chemical substances. The survey questionnaire was circulated in February 2003. A two-month period was allocated for responses back. Any agency or organisation with relevant information was encouraged to respond to the questionnaire.

12. Responses to questionnaire were received from Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United-Kingdom, and the OPCW; the United States provided the following two documents: (1) Assessment of the increased risk of terrorist or other criminal activity associated with posting off-site consequence analysis information on the Internet – Department of Justice, April 18, 2000; (2) Assessment

of incentives created by public disclosure of off-site consequence analysis information for reduction in the risk of accidental releases – US Environmental Protection Agency-CEPPO, April 18, 2000.

Workshop Programme and Participation

13. A workshop programme was prepared by a Planning Committee, consisting of representatives of sponsor organisations as well as several countries. The Workshop agenda is presented in Annex 1.

14. The Workshop consisted of the following six sessions:

Session I – Community Right-to-Know versus Information Security

The purpose of this session was to explore the tension relating to provision of information to the public concerning hazardous installations. On the one hand, making information available about risks in the community could help reduce likelihood of accidents as well as help the public understand how to react appropriately should there be a release of hazardous chemicals. On the other hand, there is a concern that providing information to the public may also provide terrorists with information they could use to help plan or carry out terrorist attacks.

Session II – Public/Private Communication Partnerships

This session examined partnerships among government, non-governmental organisations and the chemical industry to assist in the dissemination of information relevant to chemical security. The session explored models for working partnerships that can be used to share chemical security preparedness, threat and emergency information.

Session III – Chemical Facilities Security: Communication Challenges

This session explored broad approaches to facility security in order to prevent deliberate acts (such as workplace violence, vandalism, sabotage and attacks of terrorists) that might compromise the safety of sites/installations. The session provided an opportunity for participants to discuss vulnerabilities assessment methodologies and present tools, methods, guidelines and practices to demonstrate how a site security can prevent deliberate releases of hazardous substances. The challenges related to internal communications (within a hazardous installation) were also considered, as well as what information should be communicated to the public and to public authorities.

Session IV – Crisis Communication

The purpose of the session was to explore ways of effective risk communication in crises involving the release of chemicals caused by deliberate acts. Risk communication has become a key responsibility of response personnel, including public health professionals, in a crisis. The media, political decision-makers, and the general public expect timely and quality information from experts. While a crisis is by its nature difficult to predict, effective communications can be planned in advance. This session provided an opportunity for participants to discuss how to deliver a message in a crisis in order to inform the public and key decision-makers, focus attention on the issues at hand, reduce panic, and provide valuable consensus building. Participants were asked to consider how experience with risk communication for chemical accidents can be applied in the context of chemical releases caused by deliberate acts. In particular, this session provided an opportunity to consider any differences in communication requirements for accidents and for releases due to deliberate acts (e.g., in defining the appropriate target audiences, involvement of different stakeholder groups, and the nature of the adverse impacts including possible psychological aspects).

Session V – Capacity Building

The purpose of the session was to explore capacity building needs for effective response to chemical releases caused by deliberate acts, with a focus on capacity building for response personnel including medical and public health officials. (It was also addressed training of industry to improve prevention of, preparedness for, and response to deliberate acts resulting in the release of chemicals, as well as the role of the media in crises involving chemical releases). The session discussed relevant experience in capacity building and training tools that are available, as well as future training needs and tools that should be developed. In this regard, the session provided an opportunity to review experience related to capacity building for prevention of, preparedness for and response to chemical accidents, as well as experience in other relevant fields. Finally, the session provided an opportunity to explore issues such as risk perception, management and communication in order to strengthen all stakeholder roles in both developed and developing countries.

Session VI – Discussion session: Basis for developing guidance on risk communication and public information related to chemical releases caused deliberately

This session provided participants with an opportunity to discuss issues raised during earlier sessions and to review discussions in the context of the Workshop objectives. The purpose of the session was also to establish a basis for developing guidance on risk communication and public information related to deliberate chemical threats.

15. 50 experts participated in the workshop, representing nine member countries, one non-OECD country, the sponsor organisations, the European Commission, NGOs, IGOs, industrial organisations, and other stakeholders (see list of participants in Annex 2). The workshop was attended by representatives of a wide range of interested parties including:

- Governments; e.g. ministries responsible for public health, the environment, civil protection/defence, labour safety, industry;
- International organisations interested in the subject; e.g., those involved in technological and chemical accidents/disasters, chemical weapons, security of industrial installations and emergency planning and response, including the sponsoring organisations and others;
- Industry, chemical industry associations, individual companies, etc.;
- Other non-governmental organisations; e.g., environmental groups, community-based committees, etc.

16. 70 observers attended the workshop, at the invitation of the Italian Interior Ministry.

Output of the Workshop

17. The Workshop generated a series of conclusions (see further section on “Conclusions and Issues”) that could serve as the basis of guidance on risk communication and provision of information to the public related to deliberate chemical threats. These conclusions will be discussed by the OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents (WGCA)³ at their 13th Meeting on 5-7 November 2003 (OECD, Paris). The WGCA will decide whether a group of experts should be established to draft a Guidance Document on risk communication and public information related to chemical releases caused deliberately

³ The Working Group on Chemical Accidents (WGCA) is composed of representatives of OECD member countries, the European Commission, the Business and Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC), the Trade-Unions Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC), NGOs and IGOs. The WGCA manages the OECD Programme on Chemical Accidents; it meets once a year, in Paris.

(see note below). This document would provide guidance on the nature of information to share, the audiences for such information, and who should be responsible for providing information.

Note: At its 13th Meeting in November 2003, the Working Group on Chemical Accidents decided not to pursue this project.

18. The present report presents the main output of the Workshop. The conclusions and recommendations which follow, were drafted by the rapporteurs for the Workshop and do not represent a consensus of the participants in the workshop. Following the usual declassification procedure, the Workshop report will be published as OECD Environmental Health and Safety Publication, in the series on Chemical Accidents (No. 12).

Conclusions and Issues

General conclusions

1. In light of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the related new threat situation, there is a risk of deliberate acts causing releases of hazardous chemicals.
2. Both the state as the guarantor of public safety, and the operators of chemical facilities and transportation modalities, have duties with regard to preventive measures. This calls for additional activities by both parties.
3. Countries should take precautionary and preventive measures to prevent terrorism, to impede or prevent external terrorist attacks or entry by force into establishments, and to ensure that the possible effects of deliberate acts are considered in emergency plans and made aware to emergency first responders.
4. Governments should increasingly share chemical security information among nations and between different levels and agencies of government, particularly those with responsibility for foreign and domestic intelligence and for preparedness and response.
5. Operators should protect their facilities and transportation modalities with the goal of preventing hostile persons from causing a major accident.
6. Operators and governments should communicate appropriately with the public about the possible effects of chemical releases caused by deliberate acts. Decisions on the management of the related risks should be made transparent to the public in ways that do not increase those risks. Public input in those management decisions will reduce risks.
7. Countries should assist each other to improve their capacities for detection, decontamination and destruction of biological and chemical agents, and for providing related medical treatment.

Conclusions and observations from Session I

1. As a general rule, society benefits when information about the risks posed by chemical operations is shared broadly.
2. However, there is a concern that some security related information may increase risks if released broadly.

3. The fundamental question is whether a particular form of disclosure of a particular kind of information about some chemical operations would, overall, reduce or increase the risk posed by those operations.
4. Authorities should establish processes for making such determinations, whether generically or for single cases.
5. The processes should balance the expected gain in security against the expected losses, like limitation of democratic rights, loss of safety and transparency gained by risk communication.
6. In doing so, authorities may benefit by considering the examples of other authorities that have previously established such processes, such as the U.S. experience regarding Risk Management Plans, the ongoing Dutch experience with its register for risk situations involving hazardous substances and the recommendations of the German Hazardous Incidents Commission.
7. Authorities should ensure that the processes they establish include persons competent in assessing the potentials both for risks to be reduced, and to be increased, by the proposed disclosure.

Conclusions and observations from Session II

1. The participants agreed that partnerships among government, non-governmental organizations, and the chemical industry are essential to enhance environmental security and improve capacity to prevent, detect, and mitigate deliberate acts intended to create chemical releases.
2. They noted the value of public right to know laws, and the dissemination of information relevant to chemical security, as an important component of public/private partnerships to achieve safer and more secure facilities. At the same time, participants agreed that a balance should be achieved between providing meaningful information relevant to community security and providing information too broadly in ways that may assist would-be attackers.
3. Enterprises conducting chemical operations should establish effective communication channels with relevant public authorities at all levels of government, including those responsible for emergency preparedness and response, domestic security, and public health and safety.
4. Participants recognized that chemical security entails not just site security. Security for chemical facilities necessarily extends to the management of chemicals from supply chain to the environmentally sound disposal of hazardous wastes, and includes secure operations, information systems, health, safety and emergency response regimes.
5. In addition to physical security measures, facilities should consider environmental management regimes which reduce risks and pollution, incorporate security measures, and integrate communications in these areas with secure communication to emergency responders and other agencies, where feasible.
6. Direct communication with the public should be planned, coordinated, and designed to be effective to the entire community at risk. Emergency response plans should be updated to include scenarios for intentional acts. Facilities and government authorities should ensure that they are implemented. Training and practical exercises are recommended.

Conclusions and observations from Session III

1. It is basically possible for attacks on an establishment to be mounted by external or internal offenders.
2. If major accidents can be prevented by safer technology this will reduce security risks.
3. Under the new threat situation it is necessary to impede and detect ingress by unauthorised persons into the relevant establishment. The perimeters of establishments – or if appropriate the common perimeter in the case of industrial complexes – must be secured by technical and organisational means to ensure that unauthorised persons cannot gain access without using force. This should include effective fences kept under surveillance, organisation of gate controls and patrols, etc.
4. Non-site personnel should be kept identifiable. Visitors and external companies must be monitored appropriately.
5. Industrial complexes (especially chemical parks) place special demands on security measures because of the large number of legally independent operators. As a rule, the vulnerability of hazardous installations can only be minimised by means of a coordinated security system (common site fence and security personnel).
6. Employees must be made aware of the need to secure the establishment, and must be involved.
7. It may be necessary to take additional measures to protect installations or parts thereof that are especially hazardous or at risk from terrorist attacks from interference by unauthorised persons. The measures to be taken are to be derived from a systematic approach (Security Analysis), for which different methodological approaches exist.
8. Much of the information necessary for assessment of the security risk situation by the operators and the authorities is already available under the provisions on the safety report according to the EU Seveso II Directive. The Security Analysis may be a part of the overall Safety Report according to the EU Seveso-II-Directive.
9. Countries should take precautionary and preventive measures to impede or prevent external terrorist attacks or entry by force into establishments. The necessary resources for this purpose must be made available even in times of limited budgets.
10. The measures taken by the state and by the operator should be in keeping with the nature and extent of the security risk.
11. Among the most vulnerable points in the chemical supply chain involve transportation of chemicals through seaports, by ships, on railways, on roads, and through pipelines. Government agencies and industry should focus their collaborative security efforts on inter-modal transportation, and in particular, ports and terminals where chemicals and fuels may be instruments of attacking critical infrastructures. Governments should foster collaboration among the many agencies and authorities that have information, data, and intelligence that are relevant to detect suspect shipments, consistent with IMO recommendations and those in reports on crime and security in seaports.
12. Since total protection can never be guaranteed, external emergency measures have a particularly important role to play. The competent authorities in this sector must receive the necessary

information from the operators and must take the measures within their sphere of responsibility without delay.

Conclusions and observations from Session IV

1. The manner, content and delivery of information to the public at the time of a deliberate act using chemicals will influence the ability of the public to act properly in minimizing the health impact (including psychological effects).
2. Countries need to prepare crisis communication plans, and these plans should “expect the unexpected” and should be evaluated.
3. Countries should develop formal risk and crisis communication plans that clearly identify roles, responsibilities, training needs, competencies, and procedures, also taking into account the unexpected (with the assistance of international organizations).
4. Countries should develop back-up plans, back-up facilities, back-up procedures, and back-up personnel plans.
5. Countries should develop and undertake tabletop, role play, and simulation exercises that test crisis communication capabilities *vis-à-vis* the public and media.

Conclusions and observations from Session V

1. Countries face the need to strengthen the competencies and capabilities in health communication of those involved in emergency response, especially with regard to deliberate acts.
2. The ability of countries to detect deliberate acts early, for example in the case of “silent release,” and to timely respond to such acts, depends in part upon a well developed public health infrastructure.
3. Countries, with the assistance of international organizations, should train those involved in responding to deliberate chemical releases in the principles of health risk communication. Materials should be developed to strengthen the capacities of a range of professionals, including public health professionals, emergency responders, medical professionals and others.
4. In order to strengthen the information basis for risk communication, countries (together with international organizations, where appropriate) should improve their capabilities regarding surveillance, early detection, and epidemiological investigation of chemical incidents caused by deliberate acts.

Conclusions and observations from Session VI - Basis for Guidance

19. The Workshop reviewed the work of the rapporteurs summarizing the conclusions of the previous sessions. Participants identified areas for further work concerning risk communication and provision of information to the public in the context of deliberate chemical threats. The final set of conclusions could serve as the basis of guidance to provide concrete recommendations on the nature of information to share, the audiences for such information, and who should be responsible for providing information.

ANNEX 1

Workshop on Communication related to Chemical Releases Caused by Deliberate Acts

Rome, 25–27 June 2003

AGENDA

Wednesday 25 June 2003

**9:00 – 10:00 REGISTRATION
Distribution of badges**

Welcoming addresses

Host country: **Francesco Paolo Palmeri**, Civil Defense and Civil Protection, Ministry of Interior, Italy [10-15 min]

Guido Parisi, ISA, Italy

Sponsor organisations: [total: ≤ 1h]	OECD	<i>Rob Visser</i>	[15-20 min]
	NATO	<i>Carsten Fausboll</i>	[≤ 5 min]
	REMPEC/IMO	<i>Elias Sampatakakis</i>	[≤ 5 min]
	OPCW	<i>Sukanya Devarajan</i>	[≤ 5 min]
	UN ECE	<i>Jeremy Wates</i>	[≤ 5 min]
	UNEP		
	WHO	<i>Kersten Gutschmidt</i>	[≤ 5 min]

Introduction

[10 min] ***Debbie Dietrich***, US EPA, Workshop Chair
Workshop Objectives

[15-20 min] ***Marie-Chantal Huet***, OECD Secretariat

- (i) Workshop Agenda
- (ii) Survey on existing policies and programmes used for public information related to deliberate chemical threats

11:30 – 15:30 SESSION I

[Duration: $\geq 2\text{h}30$]

Community Right-to-Know *versus* Information Security

Please note that the lunch break will begin at 13H00

Session Chair: *Giancarlo Ludovisi, ISPESL, Italy*

The purpose of this session is to explore the tension relating to provision of information to the public concerning hazardous installations. On the one hand, making information available about risks in the community could help reduce likelihood of accidents as well as help the public understand how to react appropriately should there be a release of hazardous chemicals. On the other hand, there is a concern that providing information to the public may also provide terrorists with information they could use to help plan or carry out terrorist attacks.

Presentations:

- **Jeremy Wates, UN ECE**
"The UN ECE Convention and the PRTR protocol"
- **Roland Fendler, UBA, Germany**
"Germany's regulations on confidentiality of information"
- **Kathy Jones, EPA, USA**
"Communication and chemical safety"
- **Giancarlo Ludovisi, ISPESL, Italy**
"Management of emergencies due to deliberate acts"
- **Cees Braams, Ministry of Housing, Planning and the Environment, The Netherlands**
"The new Dutch register for risk-situations involving hazardous substances"
- **Apostolos Paralikas, European Environmental Bureau (EEB)**
"Community right-to-know – Protecting the public and reducing the threat: A win-win situation"

13:00 – 14:30 LUNCH

14:30 – 15:30 SESSION I (continued)

Community Right-to-Know *versus* Information Security

Continuation of Session I

Please note that a 30-minute coffee break will be taken at end of Session I, at 15H30

16:00 – 18:00 SESSION II

[duration: ≤ 2h]

Public/Private Communication Partnerships

Session Chair: *Michael Penders*, President of Environmental Security International, USA

This session will examine partnerships among government, non-governmental organisations and the chemical industry to assist in the dissemination of information relevant to chemical security. This session will explore models for working partnerships that can be used to share chemical security preparedness, threat and emergency information.

Presentations:

- ***Mary-Ann Spicer***, NEEC, Environment Canada, Canada
"Some initiatives in Environment Canada since September 11"
- ***Michael Penders***, Environmental Security International
"Security chemical safety and the public right to know: Reconciling public and private imperatives and or community environmental security"
- ***Paul Orum***, Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, USA
"Communicating problems AND solutions: A public interest perspective on chemical security"
- ***James Conrad***, American Chemistry Council (ACC)
"Responsible Care® models for communication partnerships"
- ***Timothy Gablehouse***, Colorado Emergency Planning Commission
"Information sharing between facilities and communities improves safety, builds capacity and enhances security"
- ***Roberto Arditti***, Journalist, Italy
"Emergency communication – How institutions can work with media"

18:00

End of day 1

Thursday 26 June 2003

9:30 – 11:30 SESSION III

[Duration: 2h]

Chemical Facilities Security: Communication Challenges

Session Chair: *Christian Jochum*, Major Hazards Commission, Germany

The purpose of this session is to explore broad approaches to facility security in order to prevent deliberate acts (such as workplace violence, vandalism, sabotage and attacks of terrorists) that might compromise the safety of sites/installations. This session will provide an opportunity for participants to discuss vulnerabilities assessment methodologies and present tools, methods, guidelines and practices to demonstrate how a site security can prevent deliberate releases of hazardous substances. This session will also explore the challenges related to internal communications (within a hazardous installation) as well as consider what information should be communicated to the public and to public authorities.

Presentations:

- **Joachim Uth**, UBA, Germany
"The German Guideline on Combating Interference by Unauthorised Persons"
- **Paola De Nictolis**, Engineer, Ministry of Interior
"Security of highly hazardous chemical facilities – The importance of internal and external communications as prevention activity"
- **Herbert Bender**, BASF on behalf of the European chemistry CEFIC
"Vulnerability assessment methodologies and preventive measures"

Please note that a 30-minute coffee break will be taken at end of Session III, at 11H30.

12:00 – 15:30 SESSION IV

[Duration: 2h]

Crisis Communication

Please note that the lunch break will begin at 13H00

Session Chair: *Randy Hyer*, Communicable Disease Surveillance and response, WHO
Co-Chair *Kersten Gutschmidt*, International Programme on Chemical Safety, WHO

The purpose of the session is to explore ways of effective risk communication in crises involving the release of chemicals caused by deliberate acts. Risk communication has become a key responsibility of response personnel, including public health professionals, in a crisis. The media, political decision-makers, and the general public expect timely and quality information from experts. While a crisis is by its nature difficult to predict, effective communications can be planned in advance. This session will provide an opportunity for participants to discuss how to deliver a message in a crisis in order to inform the public and key decision-makers, focus attention on the issues at hand, reduce panic, and provide valuable consensus building. Participants will be asked to consider how experience with risk communication for chemical

accidents can be applied in the context of chemical releases caused by deliberate acts. In particular, this session will provide an opportunity to consider any differences in communication requirements for accidents and for releases due to deliberate acts (e.g., in defining the appropriate target audiences, involvement of different stakeholder groups, and the nature of the adverse impacts including possible psychological aspects).

Presentations:

- **Randy Hyer**, WHO
"Global guidance on public health communications" [15 min]
- **Vincento Covello**, Director of Center for Risk Communication, New York, USA
"Rising to the risk and crisis communication challenge: Lessons learned from New York City's Response to 9/11" [25 min]
- **Brian Butler**, Counter-Terrorism Communications, UK
"Making the Public Alert not alarmed - the UK experience" [20 min]
- **Mario Troiano**, European Institute of Psychology of Emergency
"Methodology of emergency psychology and psychological aspects in the prevention, planning and managing of emergency" [15 min]

13:00 – 14:30 LUNCH

14:30 – 15:30 SESSION IV (continued)
Crisis Communication

Continuation of Session IV

Please note that a 30-minute coffee break will be taken at end of Session IV, at 15H30

16:00 – 18:00 SESSION V [Duration: 2h]
Capacity Building

Session Chair: *Gary Coleman*, Director of WHO Collaborating Centre for the Public Health Management of Chemical Incidents, Health Protection Agency, Cardiff, UK

Co-Chair *Kersten Gutschmidt*, IPCS, WHO

The purpose of the session is to explore capacity building needs for effective response to chemical releases caused by deliberate acts, with a focus on capacity building for response personnel including medical and public health officials. (It will also address training of industry to improve prevention of, preparedness for, and response to deliberate acts resulting in the release of chemicals, as well as the role of the media in crises involving chemical releases). The session will discuss relevant experience in capacity building and training tools that are available, as well as future training needs and tools that should be developed. In this regard, the session will provide an opportunity to review experience related to capacity building for

prevention of, preparedness for and response to chemical accidents, as well as experience in other relevant fields. The session provides opportunity to explore issues such as risk perception, management and communication in order to strengthen all stakeholder roles in both developed and developing countries.

Presentations:

- **Stephen Palmer**, University of Wales College of Medicine, UK
"Capacity building and lessons learnt" [20 min]
- **Isis Pluut**, Emergency and Humanitarian Action, WHO
"The need for capacity building" [15 min]
- **Gratiliano Gai**, Ministry of Health, Italy
"Sanitary instruments and objects predisposed from the Ministry of health for response to chemical accidents caused by deliberate acts" [15 min]
- **Silvano Barberi**, Ministry of Interior, Italy
"Analysis of lessons learnt as regard to the prevention procedures, planning activities and management of chemical accidents, with particular attention to NBCR ones" [15 min]

18:00

End of day 2

Friday 27 June 2003

9:30 – 11:00 SESSION VI

[Duration: 1h30]

Discussion Session – Basis for developing guidance on risk communication and public information related to chemical releases caused deliberately

Session Chair: *Fabrizio Colcerasa*, Director of the Central Directorate for Emergency and Technical Rescue, Ministry of Interior, Italy

Along with *the Chairs of previous sessions*

The purpose of this session is to provide participants with an opportunity to discuss issues raised during earlier sessions and to review discussions in the context of the Workshop objectives. It will provide the basis for making recommendations related to the development of guidance. In this regard, the session will explore effective policies and practices, including consideration of the nature of information that should be shared, the audiences for such information, and who should be responsible for providing information.

There will be no formal presentations during this session

Please note that a one-hour coffee break will be taken at end of Session VI, at 11H00.

12:00 – 14:00 CLOSING SESSION
General Discussion

[Duration: 2h]

Session Chairs: *Debbie Dietrich*, US EPA, Workshop Chair
Francesco Paolo Palmeri, Prefect, Director of the Central Directorate for Civil Defence and Civil Protection Policy, Ministry of Interior, Italy

During this session, the Workshop rapporteurs will present draft Workshop conclusions and recommendations, which will:

- Summarise the main Workshop discussion issues;
- Present recommendations concerning “best practices”;
- Identify issues that should be further explored in a national or international context; and
- Include proposal(s), as appropriate, for developing guidance on risk communication and public information related to chemical releases caused deliberately. This could address, *inter alia*, the nature of information that should be shared, the audiences for such information, and who should be responsible for providing information.

14:00

End of Workshop

ANNEX 2

PARTICIPANTS LIST

Workshop on Communication related to Chemical Releases Caused by Deliberate Acts 25 - 27 June 2003, Rome, Italy

Austria

Brigitte Brenner

Federal Ministry of the Interior
Department II/4 (Civil Protection and Flight Police)
Herrengasse 7, P.O. Box 100
A-1014 Vienna, Austria

Tel: +43 1 53126-3418
Fax: +43 1 53126-3476
E-mail: Brigitte.Brenner@bmigv.at

Canada / Canada

Mary-Ann SPICER

Environmental Emergencies Branch
Environment Canada
351 St. Joseph Blvd, 15th floor
Hull, Quebec

Tel : (819) 994-4431 / Fax : (819) 953-5361
Email : mary-ann.spicer@ec.gc.ca

Germany / Allemagne

Uwe CREUTZ

BASF AG
GP / WS - C 100
D-67056 LUDWIGSHAFEN

Tel : 0049-621-6040.710
Email : creutz@basf-ag.de

Roland FENDLER

Umweltbundesamt
Postfach 33 00 22
D-14191 BERLIN

Tel : 0049-30-8903.3679 / Fax : 0049-30-8903.3099
Email : roland.fendler@uba.de

Christian JOCHUM

Gerlin Risiko Consulting GmbH
Robert-Stolz-Str. 54
D-65812 BAD SODEN

Tel : 0049-6196-61656 / Fax : 0049-6196-61657
Email : chr.jochum@t-online.de

Hans Joachim UTH

Federal Environmental Agency
Seeckstrasse 6-10
D-14191 Berlin

Tel : 49 30 890 33457 / Fax : 49 30 890 33099
Email : jochen.uth@uba.de

Hans-Peter ZIEGENFUSS
Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt
Staatl. Umweltamt Hanau
Willi-Brandt-Str. 23
D-63450 HANAU

Tel : 0049-6181-3058.310 / Fax : 0049-6181-3058.103
Email : HP.Ziegenfuss@rpu-hu-hessen.de

Italy / Italie

Roberto ARDITTI
RAI
Viale Mazzini 114
00195 Rome

Tel : + 39 06 36822043 / Email : r.arditti@rai.it

Silvano BARBERI
Dipartimento dei Vigili del fuoco, del soccorso pubblico e della
difesa civile
Commandante provinciale dei vigili del fuoco di Lecco
Via Amendola 4 – Lecco, Italy

Tel : + 39 0341 287400 / Fax : + 39 0341 287420
Email : vf.lecco-comandante@infinito.it

Fabrizio COLCERASA
Ministry of the Interior
Directorate General for Civil
Piazza Del Viminale
Rome 184

Tel : 39 6 4653 6831 / Fax : 39 6 4817 789
Email : centrooperativovf@mininerno.it

Paola DE NICTOLIS
Ministry of Interior- National Firebrigade
via Cavour, 5
00184 Rome

Tel : +39 0646 52 9408 / Fax : +39 0646 52 9522
Email : centrooperativovf@mininterno.it

Mauro FRANCIOSI
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali
Via Vittorio Veneto 56
00187 Rome

Email : segr.gabinetto@minwelfare.it

Massimiliano GADDINI
Ministry of Interior
Piazza Scilla 2
00178 Rome

Tel : + 39 06 7180551

Roberta GAGLIARDI

Istituto Superiore per la prevenzione e la Sicurezza sul Lavoro
Via Urbana 167
00184 Rome

Tel : +39 06 47 14 256 / Fax : +39 06 47 44 017
Email : rygagliardi@libero.it

Gratiliano GAI

Lungotevere Ripa 1
00153 Rome

Tel : + 39 06 59945472 / Fax : + 39 06 59945009
Email : g.gai@sanita.it

Giancarlo LUDOVISI

(ISPESL)
Via Urbana 167
00184 Roma

Tel : +39 06 47 14 248 / Fax : +39 06 47 44 017
Email : ludovisi@tin.it

Francesco Paolo PALMERI

Ministry of Interior
Civil Defence & Civil Protection Policy
Piazza Viminale
00184 Rome

Tel : + 39 06 4883120 / Fax : + 39 06 46547616

Guido PARISI

Instituto Superiore Antincendi
Via del Commercio 13
00154 Rome

Tel : + 39 06 57064240 / Fax : + 39 06 5740091
Email : guido.parisi@tin.it

Alberto RICCHIUTI

APAT
Via Brancati 48
00144 Rome

Tel : + 39 06 5007 2530 / Fax : + 39 06 5057 2531

Mario TROIANO

European Institute of Psychology
Via Mario Musco 73
00100 Rome

Tel : + 39 06 5412687

Mexico / Mexique

Luis Héctor BAROJAS WEBER

Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
Blvd. Adolfo Ruíz Cortines # 4209, piso 4, Fracc. Jardines de la
Montaña, Del. Tlalpan
Mexico City 14210

Tel : (+52) 56.28.07.63 / Fax : (+52) 56.28.06.32
Email : lbarojas@semarnat.gob.mx

Netherlands / Pays-Bas

Cees BRAAMS

Ministry of Housing Spatial Planning and the Environment
Rijnstraat 8
The Hague

Tel : + 31-70-339-4133 / Fax : + 31-70-339-1084
Email : cees.braams@minvrom.nl

Sweden / Suède

Karin MÅWE

Swedish Emergency Management Agency
Kungsgatan 53
S-103 33 Stockholm

Tel : +46 8 593 711 96 / Fax : +46 8 593 710 01
Email : karin.mawe@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se

Malin MODH

Swedish Emergency Management Agency
Kungsgatan 53
SE-101 31 Stockholm

Tel : +46 8 593 712 44 / Fax : +46 8 593 710 01
Email : malin.modh@krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se

United Kingdom / Royaume-Uni

Val BOWMAN

Emergency Planning Society
Floor 3 Pennine House, The Galleries
Tyne & Wear, NE37 1LY

Tel : 44 191 417 5619 / Fax : + 44 191 417 5940
Email : yalbowman@tynelandwearepu.gov.uk

Rosanna BRIGGS

Essex County Council
County Hall
Chelmsford
PO Box 297 Essex CM1 1YS

Tel : + 44(0) 1245 430373 / Fax : + 44(0) 1245 430368
Email : rosanna.briggs@essescc.gov.uk

Brian BUTLER

Counter-Terrorism Communications
Home Office
10 Great George Street
London

Tel : 00 44 790 167 0068
Email: brian.butler@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

United States / Etats-Unis

James CONRAD
American Chemistry Council
1300 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Tel : + 703-741-5166 / Fax : + 703-741-6092
Email : james_conrad@americanchemistry.com

Debbie DIETRICH
US Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20460

Tel : +1 202 564 8600 / Fax : +1 202 564 8222
Email : dietrich.debbie@epa.gov

Timothy GABLEHOUSE
Colorado Emergency Planning Commission
410 17th Street
Denver, Colorado 80202

Tel : 1 303 572 0050 / Fax : 1 303 572 3037
Email : tgablehouse@worldnet.att.net

Kathy JONES
U.S Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington D.C.

Tel : +1 202 564 8353 / Fax : +1 202 564 8222
Email : jones.kathy@epa.gov

Paul ORUM
Working Group on Community Right-to-Know
218 D Street, SE
Washington, DC 20003

Tel : 1 202 544 9586 / Fax : 1 202 546 2461
Email : orum@rtk.net

Michael PENDERS
Environmental Security International
601 Pennsylvannia Avenue
Washington D.C. 20004

Tel : + 202-312-2000
Email : mpenders@esisecurity.com

EC / CE

John DUFFIELD

EC Joint Research Centre, Major Accident Hazards Bureau
Via Enrico Fermi
21020 Ispra (VA)
Italy

Tel : +39 0332 789 224 / Fax : +39 0332 789 007
Email : stuart.duffield@jrc.it

**Islamic Republic of Iran / République
Islamique d'Iran**

Ali Reza HAJIZADEH

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
National Authority for Conventions on Chemicals
United Nations Avenue
Tehran
Islamic Republic of Iran

Tel : + 98 21 3212621 / Fax : + 98 21 3900094
Email : arhajizadeh@yahoo.co.uk

**Business and Industry Advisory
Committee (BIAC) / Comité consultatif
économique et industriel (BIAC)**

Herbert BENDER

BASF-AG
DUS/TD, M940
D-67056 Ludwigshafen
Germany

Tel : 49 621 60 56 455 / Fax : 40 621 60 74 140
Email : herbert.bender@basf-ag.de

**International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) / Organisation Internationale
Maritime**

Elias SAMPATAKAKIS

Chemical Engineer
Manoel Island
GZR 03 Gzira
Malta

Tel : 00356 21 33 92 76
Email : esampatakakis@rempec.org

**North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) / Organisation du Traité de
l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN)**

Carsten FAUSBOLL

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Civil Emergency Planning Division
19 Avenue G.E. Lebon
Bruxelles
Belgium

Tel : + 3227074308 / Fax : + 3227077900
Email : cepd@hq.nato.int

Tiina PELTOLA-LAMPI

NATO
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
B-1110
Brussels
Belgium

Tel : + 32-2-7072675 / Fax : + 32-2-7072677
Email : eadrcc@hq.nato.int

**U.N. Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE) / Commission Economique pour
l'Europe des Nations Unies (CEE-ONU)**

**World Health Organization (WHO) /
Organisation mondiale de la Santé
(OMS)**

Jeremy WATES

U. N. Economic Commission for Europe
Environment and Human Settlements Division
Bureau 332Palais des Nations
Geneva 10, Switzerland

Tel : +41 22 917 23 84 / Fax : +41-22-907-0107
Email : jeremy.wates@unece.org

Gary COLEMAN

WHO Collaborating Centre
University of Wales Institute, Cardiff
RSH Unit
P.O. Box 377 Western Avenue
Cardiff CF5 2SG
United Kingdom

Tel : +44 292 041 6852
Fax : +44 292 041 6803
Email : gcoleman@uwic.ac.uk

Kersten GUTSCHMIDT

Programme on Chemical Safety
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
20 Avenue Appia
1211 Geneva 27
Switzerland

Tel : +41 22 791 3731 / Fax : +41 22 791 4848
Email : gutschmidt@who.int

Randall HYER

World Health Organisation
Dept. Communicable Disease Surveillance & Response
20 Avenue Appia
1211 Geneva 27
Switzerland

Tel : + 41-22-791-1304 / Fax : + 41-22-791-4198
Email : hyerr@who.int

Stephen PALMER

World Health Organisation
Dept. of Epidemiolgy, Statistics & Public Health
Cardiff, CF 14 4 XN
United Kingdom

Tel : + 44 2920 742321 / Fax : + 44 2920 742898
Email : palmersr@cardiff.ac.uk

Isis PLUUT

World Health Organisation
Dept of Emergency & Humanitarian Action
Avenue Appia 20
1211 Geneva 27
Switzerland

Tel : + 41 22 791 2704 / Fax : + 41 22 791 4844
Email : pluute@who.int

Mr. Vincent COVELLO
World Health Organisation
Center For Risk Communication
29 Washington Square West
New York 10011
United States

Tel : + 212-222-7841 / Fax : + 212-749-3590
Email : vincentcovello@ix.netcom.com

European Environmental Organisation /
European Environmental Organisation

Apostolos PARALIKAS
European Environmental Organisation
Technical University of Athens
31 Kolokotroni str.
105 62 Athens
Greece

Tel : +3010 7723202 (University Athens)
Fax : +3010 3224344
Email : aparal@tee.gr

Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) /
Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Suki DEVARAJAN
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW)
International Cooperation and Assistance Division
Johan de Wittlaan 32
2517 JR The Hague
Netherlands

Tel : +31 70 416 3775 / Fax : + 31 70 306 3535
Email : sukanya.devarajan@opcw.or

OECD / OCDE

Marie-Chantal HUET
ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE
2, rue André Pascal
75016 Paris
France

Tel : 01 45 24 79 03 / Fax : +33 1 45 24 16 75
Email : Marie-Chantal.HUET@oecd.org

Robert VISSER
ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE
2, rue André Pascal
75016 Paris
France

Tel : 01 45 24 93 15 / Fax : + 33 1 45 24 16 75
Email : Robert.VISSER@oecd.org